Abstract-Lattice coding over a Gaussian wiretap channel, where an eavesdropper listens to transmissions between a transmitter and a legitimate receiver, is considered. A new lattice invariant called the secrecy gain is used as a code design criterion for wiretap lattice codes since it was shown to characterize the confusion that a chosen lattice can cause at the eavesdropper: the higher the secrecy gain of the lattice, the more confusion. In this paper, secrecy gains of extremal odd unimodular lattices as well as unimodular lattices in dimension , , are computed, covering the four extremal odd unimodular lattices and all the 111 nonextremal unimodular lattices (both odd and even), providing thus a classification of the best wiretap lattice codes coming from unimodular lattices in dimension , . Finally, to permit lattice encoding via Construction A, the corresponding error correction codes of the best lattices are determined.
In this paper, we will focus on Gaussian wiretap channels, whose secrecy capacity was established in [6] . Examples of existing Gaussian wiretap codes were designed for binary inputs, as in [7] and [8] . A different approach was adopted in [1] , where lattice codes were proposed, using as design criterion a new lattice invariant called secrecy gain, which was shown to characterize the confusion at the eavesdropper. This suggests the study of the secrecy gain of lattices as a way to understand how to design a good Gaussian wiretap code. However, the secrecy gain of a lattice, defined as the maximum of its secrecy function (defined in Section II), is in general difficult to compute. Belfiore and Solé [9] discovered a symmetry point in the secrecy function of unimodular lattices and conjectured that the symmetry point (called weak secrecy gain) is actually the secrecy gain. They then studied the weak secrecy gain of even unimodular lattices and both weak secrecy gains for a special class of lattices called extremal lattices were computed, and the asymptotic behavior of the average weak secrecy gain as a function of the dimension was investigated. Works in [1] and [9] were further developed in [10] , where coding examples were detailed and it was shown that as grows to infinity, all even unimodular lattices behave in the same way, so that optimizing the secrecy gain makes sense in small dimensions. Recently, Ernvall-Hytönen [11] , [12] invented a method to prove or disprove the conjecture in [9] . She then verified that the weak secrecy gains of the even extremal unimodular lattices computed in [9] are actually the secrecy gains.
The work in [9] and [10] deals with even unimodular lattices, which only exist in dimensions a multiple of 8. We pursue the study of unimodular lattices by considering odd unimodular lattices, which on the contrary exist in every dimension and in great number, giving thus more flexibility in the code design. We will also show examples of odd unimodular lattices outperforming even unimodular lattices. Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
1) We compute the weak secrecy gain of unimodular lattices in dimension , , covering the four extremal odd unimodular lattices as well as all the 111 nonextremal unimodular lattices. Then, we verify, using the method in [11] and [12] , that these weak secrecy gains computed are actually secrecy gains. 2) We classify the best Gaussian wiretap codes from unimodular lattices in dimension , , together with their corresponding self-dual codes enabling lattice encoding via Construction A. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we first give a brief introduction to unimodular lattices and their theta series as well as recall the definition of the secrecy gain and the previous results concerning this 0018 -9448/$31.00 © 2013 IEEE lattice invariant. The main results are given in Section III. An explicit formula for the weak secrecy gain of unimodular lattices is derived, which generalizes the one for the even case in [10] . Secrecy gains of extremal odd unimodular lattices are computed to complete the study of extremal unimodular lattices. Finally, secrecy gains of unimodular lattices in dimension , both odd and even, are computed, ending the classification of unimodular wiretap lattice codes in dimension , . In Section IV, encoding of the best codes via Construction A is discussed.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PREVIOUS RESULTS
Consider a Gaussian wiretap channel, which is modeled as follows: Alice wants to send data to Bob on a Gaussian channel whose noise variance is given by . Eve is the eavesdropper trying to intercept data through another Gaussian channel with noise variance , where , in order to have a positive secrecy capacity [6] . More precisely, the model is (1) where is the transmitted signal, and denote the Gaussian noise vectors at Bob's, respectively Eve's side, each component of both vectors with zero mean, and respective variance and , and finally, and are the received signals at Bob's, respectively, Eve's side. In this paper, we choose to be a codeword coming from a specially designed lattice of dimension , namely, we consider lattice coding. Let us thus start by recalling some concepts concerning lattices, in particular, unimodular lattices.
A. Unimodular Lattices
A lattice is a discrete set of points in , which can be described in terms of its generator matrix by where and the row vectors , form a basis of the lattice. The matrix where denotes the transpose of , is called the Gram matrix of the lattice. It is easy to see that the th entry of is the inner product of the th and th row vectors of , denoted by A lattice is called an integral lattice if its Gram matrix is an integral matrix. The determinant of a lattice is the determinant of the matrix , which is independent of the choice of the matrix . A fundamental region for a lattice is a building block which when repeated many times fills the whole space with just one lattice point in each copy. There are many different ways of choosing a fundamental region for a lattice , but the volume of the fundamental region is uniquely determined by and called the volume of , which is exactly . Let us see an example of a fundamental region of a lattice. A Voronoi cell of a lattice point in consists of the points in the space that are closer to than to any other lattice points of .
The dual of a lattice of dimension is defined to be There are certain integral lattices which play the role of building blocks in analyzing lattices. They are denoted by , , , , and are called irreducible root lattices [13] . Unimodular lattices are then decomposed into a number of such lattices. More precisely, an -dimensional unimodular lattice is described as one containing a sublattice which is the direct sum of a number of irreducible root lattices of total dimension , and consequently a lattice point of can be written as where each component is chosen as one of a standard system of representatives for the cosets of in and called a glue vector for . Informally speaking, is obtained by gluing together the components by the glue vectors. The existence of glue vectors will be indicated by " " all through this paper. Let us see an example of the simplest case that is called self-glue. , that contain no vector of norm 1 is given in [14] ; each lattice is described by its components. The kissing number of a lattice (sphere) packing is the number of spheres that touch one sphere. The kissing numbers of these unimodular lattices are also given in the same table.
Let us recall the definition of the Jacobi theta functions and the theta series of lattices before we end this section. Let denote the upper half plane and let , where . Definition 2.2: Jacobi theta functions are defined as follows:
They are very important functions in analytic number theory. For example, the discriminant function defined in [14] can be represented by and :
The theta series of a lattice is defined by
If we combine the terms with the same exponent, the theta series of an integral lattice can be written as
By doing that we can interpret the theta series of as a book keeping device recording the number of vectors with norm in the coefficient . Take the 1-D lattice for example and recall the definition of the Jacobi function . We have (4) Similarly, the theta series of the -dimensional lattice is then (5) Theta series of lattices are well-studied object in analytic number theory. Here is a well-known result concerning theta series of unimodular lattices.
Lemma 2.4 (Hecke) [14]: If is a unimodular lattice then
This lemma tells us that the theta series of any unimodular lattice can be generated by and . A special case of this result concerning only even unimodular lattices (with and instead in that case) was utilized in [9] and [10] . These objects we have discussed in the last part of this section are actually modular forms. Interested readers may refer to [15] for an introduction.
B. Previous Results
Lattice encoding for the wiretap channel (1) is done via a generic coset coding strategy [1] : let be two nested lattices. A -bit message is mapped to a coset in , after which a vector is randomly chosen from the coset as the encoded word. The lattice can be interpreted as introducing confusion for Eve, while is intended to ensure reliability for Bob. Since a message is now corresponding to a coset of codewords instead of one single codeword, the probability of correct decoding is then summing over the whole coset (suppose that we do not have power constraint and are utilizing the whole lattice to do the encoding). Here, we are interested in computing , Eve's probability of correct decision, and want to minimize the probability. It was shown in [1] and [10] that to minimize is to minimize (6) which is easily recognized as the theta series of at . We, hence, only care about values of such that , . Motivated by the above argument, the confusion brought by the lattice with respect to no coding (namely, use a scaled version of the lattice with the same volume) is measured as follows:
Definition 2.5: [1] : Let be an -dimensional lattice of volume . The secrecy function of is given by
The secrecy gain is then the maximal value of the secrecy function with respect to and is denoted by . A large class of lattices was shown to have a symmetry point, called weak secrecy gain, at in their secrecy function [10] . (See Fig. 1 in Section III for an example.) We will still denote the weak secrecy gain by since all the weak secrecy gains computed in this paper are also shown to be the secrecy gains. This class of lattices contains lattices whose duals are obtained from themselves by possibly a rotation, reflection, and change of scale. Let us now focus on unimodular lattices, for which we have by definition. It was a conjecture by Belfiore and Solé [9] that for unimodular lattices, is not only the symmetry point, but also the point achieving the secrecy gain:
This conjecture was recently proven by Ernvall-Hytönen [11] , [12] for a special class of lattices called extremal even unimodular lattices. The idea of the proof is to write the secrecy function of a lattice as a function of the quantity She shows that and that the maximum of is achieved at . The rest of the proof consists of showing that the function is increasing in . Later, we will prove the conjecture for extremal odd unimodular lattices as well as unimodular lattices in small dimensions using this idea.
III. SECRECY GAIN OF UNIMODULAR LATTICES IN SMALL DIMENSIONS
From Lemma 2.4, we have the following decomposition of the theta series of a unimodular lattice : (8) Consequently, the reciprocal of the weak secrecy gain of is where the first equality follows from (7), the second from (8), the fourth from (2), and the final equality from the following two useful equations concerning the Jacobi theta functions at [14] :
To summarize, the weak secrecy gain of a unimodular lattice of dimension can be written as (10) where the 's are the coefficients in (8) . This generalizes the formula for the even case in [10] and shows that the weak secrecy gain of any unimodular lattice is a rational number. Fig. 1 gives the plot of the secrecy function of the odd unimodular lattice mentioned in Example 2.1, where is plotted in decibels to transform the multiplicative symmetry point into an additive symmetry point. The symmetry point can be seen to be dB corresponding to , and hence to . The maximum can be seen to be , which we will verify in Section III-A.
A. Extremal Odd Unimodular Lattices
In order to find good Gaussian wiretap lattice codes, we look for unimodular lattices with large secrecy gain. We start by restricting our search to the class of extremal unimodular lattices.
Definition 3.1: Let be a lattice of dimension . is said to be an extremal lattice if its minimal norm is . 1 By definition, an extremal unimodular lattice of dimension contains no vector of norm ; thus, the coefficients of in the theta series given in (3) are all 0's. But by expanding (8), we can form another formal sum with coefficients represented as linear combinations of 's. Then, by comparing the first terms of the two formal sums, we have a system of linear equations in unknowns ( is obviously 1), from which a unique solution can be found. In this way, the weak secrecy gain of each extremal unimodular lattice can be computed. We illustrate this technique by computing the weak secrecy gain of .
Example 3.2: The theta series of looks like
On the other hand, by (2), (4), and (8) We now have one linear equation in one unknown which gives , yielding the weak secrecy gain (11) By applying this method, we have computed the weak secrecy gain of each extremal odd unimodular lattice in dimension (see [14] for a classification), as shown in Table I . A similar table for the even unimodular lattices can be found in [9] and [10] .
Proposition 3.3:
The secrecy conjecture is true, namely, the maximum of the secrecy function is achieved at for extremal odd unimodular lattices and the secrecy gains are given as in Table I .
Proof: The weak secrecy gains are computed as illustrated in the example of . Now we only need to show that the secrecy gains of these unimodular lattices are indeed achieved and is achieved at . It then suffices to show that the denominator is decreasing in , which is obviously true, since its derivative is negative in . Thus, the maximum of the secrecy function is achieved at , namely, . We do the same for the other three extremal odd unimodular lattices, namely That the maximum of each secrecy function is achieved at , namely, follows similarly. The proof is completed. A unimodular lattice containing vectors of norm 1 can always be written as the direct sum of a unimodular lattice without vectors of norm 1 and a cubic lattice [14] . From the definition of the secrecy function, we have that the secrecy gain is determined by the component that contains no vector of norm 1. In fact By referring to the enumeration of unimodular lattices [14] , the lattices , , , and are the only unimodular lattices that do not contain vectors of norm 1 in dimensions less than 16. The secrecy gain of was computed in [9] and [10] and observe that the secrecy gains of the other three lattices are already given in Table I . Thus, we in fact have all the best unimodular lattices in dimension , , namely, in dimension 9, in dimension 10, in dimension 11, in dimension 12, in dimension 13, in dimension 14, and in dimension 15.
We will deal with unimodular lattices in dimension , in Section III-B.
B. Unimodular Lattices in Dimensions
The computation of weak secrecy gain of extremal unimodular lattices can easily be adapted to cover a large family of unimodular lattices, namely, nonextremal unimodular lattices that do not contain vectors of norm 1 in dimensions . We show the computation of the weak secrecy gain of to illustrate the technique before deriving a general formula of the weak secrecy gain of all the 111 lattices and proving the secrecy conjecture for these lattices.
Example 3.4: The lattice does not contain any vector of norm 1. Thus, the corresponding coefficient in the theta series is 0. Its kissing number is 224, which means that the first nonzero coefficient and the theta series of looks like (12) On the other hand, by (2), (4), and (8) This time, we have two linear equations in and which gives and , yielding
We now derive a general formula for the secrecy gain of all the 111 nonextremal unimodular lattices.
Proposition 3.5: The secrecy gain conjecture is true, namely, the secrecy gain is achieved at for nonextremal unimodular lattices in dimension , and the secrecy gain is given by (14) where denotes the kissing number of . Proof: The theta series of a lattice in question looks like (15) On the other hand, by (2), (4), and (8) Now by comparing the two expressions of , we have two linear equations in and which gives and , yielding from the conjecture
We have yet to show that the maximum is indeed achieved at . Recalling the definition of secrecy function and the theta series we have just computed, the secrecy function of can be written as where and . Recall again that it was shown in [11] and [12] that and is achieved at . It suffices to show that the denominator is decreasing in . We now examine the derivative of the denominator. Note that , and the largest kissing number for these lattice is 760 (see Table II ). Now This tells us that the denominator is decreasing in and the maximum of the secrecy function is achieved at , namely, . The proof is completed. Table II 2 summarizes the secrecy gains we have computed. Observe the following.
1) In dimension 16, the odd unimodular lattice has secrecy gain 2, which outperforms its two even counterparts and , both with secrecy gain . 2) As shown in the proof, in dimension , , we need two equations to recover and . And since the lattices considered do not have vectors of norm 1, . That means the secrecy gain is totally determined by , the number of norm 2 vectors. In Table II , the lattice (in boldface) with the best secrecy gain in that dimension is the one with the smallest , which can also be seen directly from (14) . This agrees with the observation in [10] that the best secrecy gain is achieved by extremal lattices, for being extremal here is equivalent to having (the extremal lattice ), the smallest value can take. In [10] , a lower bound on the minimal secrecy gain as a function of from Siegel-Weil formula for even unimodular lattices was computed. In Fig. 2 , the points corresponding to best unimodular lattices are compared to the bound. Note that all the points are the secrecy gains of odd lattices, except for in dimension 8. We observe that when grows, the gap between the lower bound and the best lattices decreases, as suggested in [10] , where it was shown that when increases, the difference of secrecy gain becomes negligible.
IV. GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CODES FROM UNIMODULAR LATTICES
As mentioned in Section II, the secrecy gain of a lattice characterizes the amount of confusion at Eve that is gained by using this lattice as in the lattice coset code . Now that we have established the secrecy gain of all the unimodular lattices in dimension smaller than 24, we need to be able to use these lattices, particularly those with the highest secrecy gain to provide lattice coset codes. To do so, lattice encoding should be 2 in the table denotes an empty component of dimension , namely, one containing no vector of norm less than or equal to 2. Also, for the sake of simplicity, we omit " " which denotes the existence of glue vectors.
performed, which can be handled via Construction A, assuming that we can associate to the chosen lattice a suitable error correction code. We will use some terminology from classical error correction codes in this session. Unfamiliar readers can refer to [16] .
There Theorem 4.3 gives a way to find the corresponding unimodular lattice for each self-dual code, assuming that there is only one unimodular lattice having the computed kissing number. When we have more than one unimodular lattice with the same kissing number, more considerations are needed to distinguish them. Table III gives Table IV .
Proof: First by Tables I and II as well as the observations following Propositions 3.3 and 3.5, the best unimodular lattices are as shown in Table IV . Now we find their corresponding codes. That the code for the lattice is the extended Hamming code was mentioned in [10] . We only need to show the correspondence for all the even dimensions from 12 to 22. And since by Theorem 4.2, the lattices generated by the type I codes in Table III are odd unimodular lattices, the correspondence can be shown by finding the corresponding lattice for each type I code. For , 14, and 16, there is only one code of the respective length and only one odd unimodular lattice of the respective dimension, hence it is clear. Let us now deal with the rest of the even dimensions one by 18 . Since according to the observation following Proposition 3.5, the best unimodular lattices are those with the smallest kissing numbers, we can directly search for the codes that give the smallest kissing numbers. For , has a minimum distance of 6, which is greater than 4. According to Theorem 4.3, the generated lattice has kissing number 44, which is the smallest a type I code of length 22 can give. By referring to Table II , we know that it is the lattice . For , with will give the smallest kissing number and applying Theorem 4.3 again yields . There are two odd unimodular lattices both with the same kissing number 120, namely, and . Finally, for , we have a similar situation. The code with gives the smallest kissing number 180, and there are two odd unimodular lattices, and , both with the same kissing number 180.
For the odd dimensions, the unimodular lattices cannot be obtained from Construction A, since the conditions in Theorem 4.2 are necessary and sufficient and there does not exist self-dual binary codes of odd length. The proof is completed.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A recent line of work on lattice codes for Gaussian wiretap channels introduced a new lattice invariant called secrecy gain as a code design criterion which captures the confusion that lattice coding can produce at an eavesdropper. So far, only the secrecy gain of even unimodular lattices was studied. In this paper, we pursued the study of unimodular lattices by investigating the case of odd unimodular lattices, which exist in greater number and, unlike even lattices, in any dimension. We computed the secrecy gain of unimodular lattices in dimension , , covering the four extremal odd unimodular lattices as well as all the 111 nonextremal unimodular lattices. As a result, we gave a classification of the best unimodular lattice wiretap codes in small dimensions.
Future work on unimodular wiretap lattice codes concerns the asymptotic behavior of odd unimodular lattices. More generally, it is of interest to generalize the existing work on unimodular lattices to other classes of lattices.
